How you assess the outcome of the 2009 UN Climate Change Conference (UNCCC), held in Copenhagen Dec. 7-18, depends on whether you see the glass 95 percent empty or 5 percent full. And how you feel about that extremely modest progress in relation to the planet-wide urgency of the climate crisis. And what you believed was possible for an agreement among all nations of the world at this particular time regarding this enormously complicated and conflict-ridden challenge.
The good news: China and the US came a little closer to resolving their climate relationship tiff and, together with three other major emitters (India, Brazil, and South Africa), cobbled together a last-minute deal that commits to limiting average global temperature rise to 2ºC (3.6ºF) and agrees to systems for verifying carbon-reduction efforts (a major US priority, resisted by China).
Significantly, this is the first time that developing countries have agreed to verifiable emissions reductions, which weren’t required of such countries under the Kyoto Protocol, and represents a small step forward in bridging the difficult divide between “developed” and “developing” nations in addressing the climate crisis. The agreement also provides $100 billion in funds to help poorer countries to cope with climate instability and to find development pathways not based on fossil fuels. And the United States, after shunning Kyoto, then spending the last decade ignoring and obstructing climate-change negotiations, is at least back in the game.
If you believe that “something is better than nothing,” that’s pretty much the extent of the “something” that came out of Copenhagen. Not insignificant, but nowhere near what’s needed.
The bad news (summarized for space reasons): Although the final-day agreement was hashed out by some of the biggest carbon emitting nations, those negotiations excluded all the other nations that had come to Copenhagen with differing agendas and priorities. The limit of 2ºC average temperature rise was not fleshed out with specific binding commitments, and was greater than the 1.5ºC limit that many African and island nations had called for as a matter of survival.
Even worse, a study that came out at Copenhagen showed that even if all the nations met the specific emissions-reductions targets they brought to the summit, it would not in fact limit average global temperature rise to 2ºC, but would actually approach 3ºC (and much higher in some regions), an increase scientists have said would be catastrophic, especially for some of the more vulnerable nations of the world.
Indeed, the whole UN process for addressing climate change seemed strained to the breaking point as the rhetorical rift between climate-crisis perpetrators and climate-crisis victims seemed to deepen at Copenhagen. (This was the real fault line at the UNCCC, more so than the US-China conflict focused on by most US media.) Nations bearing the brunt of climate instability cite the scientific evidence that their very survival hinges on drastic emissions cuts by the major emitters, as well as payment of some sort of “climate debt” to mitigate for damage done and to afford developing nations a way forward that doesn’t make the problem worse.
Meanwhile, nations most responsible for the problem (especially the US) offer modest reductions that come nowhere close to what scientists say is necessary. The concept of climate debt was “categorically” rejected by US negotiator Todd Stern. Although Copenhagen’s goal of $100 billion in aid to impacted developing countries marks a modest step forward, like the rest of the agreement, there are no specific commitments about how—or even if—that goal will be achieved.
In short, the accord emerging from Copenhagen excludes the concerns of most nations, falls far short of what scientists say is necessary to avert disaster, and leaves plenty of wiggle room even within those weak parameters. Consequently, many observers proclaimed the outcome an utter failure. It’s not hard to look at the best available evidence and conclude: We are so fucked.
Our challenge: We’re not talking here about your typical international accord aimed at your ordinary global crisis. Generally, if such agreements languish for years while details are being hashed out, it’s not the end of the world. This time, well, it could be. For real. It sounds melodramatic, but it’s hard to overstate the urgency here. Drastic changes are needed to avert worldwide catastrophe. And soon.
With those kinds of stakes, it’s easy to be cynical, if not panicked, about the slow pace of progress in addressing the crisis. But Copenhagen, if anything, should be a wakeup call and a reminder that if we rely on those at the top to get it done, we’re pretty much fucked. There’s lots of work to do to avert climate catastrophe, which will need to take place at every level of society, everywhere, by as many people as possible. Neither cynicism nor panic will help us get there. We need to be realistic, about both the science and the politics involved. Let’s not underestimate either the urgency or the difficulty of the project.
Scientists are becoming increasingly clear about the urgency, telling us that we don’t have much time left to transition away from fossil fuels: Our current trajectory is heading directly toward some crucial tipping points, which could create runaway changes in the global climate system, leading to destruction of human and natural habitats, hundreds of millions of climate refugees, species extinctions, massive crop failures and starvation, escalating conflicts over resources, disease epidemics, and on and on.
Contrast that urgency with the difficulty of making major changes within our current political systems. The climate crisis presents humanity with a challenge of unprecedented scale and complexity.
First of all, it is inescapably global, requiring a higher level of international cooperation than any challenge humanity has ever faced. That’s why negotiations like the UNCCC are absolutely essential, despite all current flaws and shortcomings. Bringing together 192 nations—each with their own cultures, histories, and agendas—to agree about anything, much less something as fraught with conflict as energy use and climate impacts, is not easy. Add in the fact that the climate crisis requires addressing not only a global environmental crisis, but also redressing historical social injustices internationally, and, well, yeah, maybe we are totally fucked.
Then there’s the fact that countries with the greatest ability to solve the problem are the ones most thoroughly addicted to fossil fuels. Strong leadership from the United States, the nation most responsible for the climate crisis thus far, would be enormously beneficial, but realistically, that’s kind of like expecting arsonists to put out their own fires. Fossil fuels have been the lifeblood of industrial development for the last two centuries, nowhere more so than in the US. The trafficking (so to speak) of those fossil fuels has brought enormous wealth, power, and influence to certain sectors of society, and those interests now control much of the political apparatus, nationally and internationally, that currently decides the fate of humanity.
Anyone who expects that political apparatus to suddenly opt for a massive transition away from fossil fuels just because it will avert disaster for future generations is simply delusional.
Many blame Obama, citing his lack of real leadership in Copenhagen as just another of the many disappointments of his first year in office. But let’s get real: Obama has to work with the country he presides over, which includes the aforementioned power-brokers hell-bent on obstructing progress, a very loud constituency who still believe the climate crisis is some kind of hoax, and a US Senate that just gave away health care reform to powerful special interests, and threatens to do the same with climate and energy reform in the months to come. Obama went to Copenhagen with a mission to secure an international agreement that he believed could give some incentive for intransigent US political forces to move forward on this urgent issue. Time will tell if this modest mission meets with any kind of success.
Just to be clear, while these political difficulties are huge, they should not be confused with technical obstacles to addressing the climate crisis. Conceptually, we know what needs to be done, and technically, it’s quite achievable. We could get much of the way there with current, off-the-shelf technologies; and with research-and-development and international aid investments on a par with what gets spent on bank bailouts or the military, we could probably make the technical transition within a decade.
So we have the solutions; what’s lacking is the political will. Which brings us to the one major part of the Copenhagen story unmentioned so far. While delegates inside the Bella Center (where the negotiations took place) were bickering over wholly inadequate, incremental policy changes, members of civil society—NGOs and fired-up activists from around the world—massed outside, pressuring for meaningful commitments and reminding the delegates inside that real solutions do exist. They brought proposals for international climate justice, proposals for protecting the rainforests, proposals for making a rapid transition to clean energy, proposals to revive the economy with the green jobs that such a transition would bring.
They brought solutions and they brought numbers–by most accounts, numbers much greater than the number of people gathered in Seattle to protest the WTO a decade ago. This movement is large, it is sophisticated, and it is … still inadequate.
It all boils down to this: Despite all the complexity involved in solving the climate crisis, the formula for success is fairly simple and familiar. If we can create a popular movement large enough and strategically smart enough to overcome the vested interests currently gripping the levers of political power, we can win. If we don’t … we are so fucked.
Happy new year!


Leave a reply to Patrick Mazza Cancel reply